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The Products Liability Restatement Warning
Obligations: History, Corrective Justice and Efficiency
M. Stuart Madden

mum or a total safety. The informed consent, or
informed judgment rationale, reflects a societal
assessment that a product user or consumer is
entitled to make his own choice as to whether
or not a product's utility or benefits justify
exposing himself to the risk of harm.
The widely followed approach for many
years has been for litigants to pursue claims
under both doctrinal categories (negligence,
strict liability and warranty) as well as functional categories (manufacturing defect, design
defect and warning defect). As you know, the
new Restatement adopts the functional
approach. But be the approach functional or
doctrinal, under any theory of liability, a warning, if found to be necessary, must by its size
and location and intensity of language, be calculated to impress upon the reasonably prudent
user of the product the nature and extent of the
hazard involved. The language must be direct
and should where applicable describe methods
of safe use, and it must advise of significant
hazards from reasonably foreseeable misuse.
Historically, a manufacturer is not required
to give warnings regarding risks that should be
obvious to the ordinary user. The position
taken in the decisions comprising this body of
law as stated by one court is in this language:
"[a] manufacturer cannot manufacture a knife
that will not cut, or a hammer that will not mash
a thumb, or a stove that will not bum a finger.

Because a substantial amount of time is to
be devoted to the design defect aspects of the
new Restatement, I wanted to talk to you about
warnings defects. I will address the subject
from four perspectives. I will first speak about
the dominant theories of warnings decisional
law under the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
and follow that description with my reading of
the placed upon gloss on those themes by the
Third Restatement. My goal is to evaluate
whether or not the Third Restatement retards or
advances what have been the two dominant
themes in torts jurisprudence for the recent
past: corrective justice and efficiency. Lastly,
I wish to give a prognosis as to the acceptance
of the Products Liability warnings provisions in
the judicial marketplace.
Independently of a manufacturer's design
or manufacturing processes, a product seller
may be found liable if a product characteristic
is the legal cause of injury or loss, and the product is unaccompanied by warnings adequate to
make the product duly safe for its ordinarily
foreseeable use, including reasonably foreseeable misuse. These two informational obligations associated with product sales, that of providing warnings and providing instructions,
derive from two policy objectives: (1) risk
reduction and reduction of accident costs; and
(2) informed consent. Warnings as to product
hazards and instructions for reasonably safe use
are established mechanisms for risk reduction
as they obligate manufacturers to produce products that achieve optimal levels of safety. An
optimal level of safety does not mean maxi-
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not provide an effective additional measure of
~afety."~ Thus, in adopting this rule, the
Institute has made no significant sacrifice in the
tort goals of personal autonomy and reducing
preventable accidents. As importantly, the
reporters have recognized the social cost of
overwarning as described by Henderson and
Twerski in this language: "Bombarded with
nearly useless warnings about risks that rarely
materialize in harm, many consumers could be
expected to give up on warnings a~together."~
Regarding warnings to intermediaries, the
Restatement, comment i, emphasizes the
Restatement's interest in lowering accident
costs, while recognizing that it is ordinarily the
workplace supervisor who can most effectively
and efficiently communicate hazard information. This position tracks, albeit more succinctly, comment n to Restatement (Second) of Torts
$388.
What of the efficiency goals and corrective justice objectives of tort law? I wish at this
point to glimpse at the sometimes substantive
but more often nominal distinctions between
the two tort camps, as Gary Schwartz at one
point has written, both vying for the torts flag.4
These two schools comprise (1) those who say
that tort goals are properly vindicated through a
corrective justice model, and (2) those who
counter that wealth maximization and efliciency are the pursuits that should be advanced with
ardor.
In my view the new Restatement's treatment of warnings fares well under both corrective justice and efficiency principles. Viewed
in terms of the personal autonomy component
of corrective justice, the informed consent
rationale was put forth by the Fifth Circuit in
Bore1 v. Fibreboard Paper Products ~ o r p ?

The law does not require him to warn of such
common dangers."'
When products are sold in bulk to an intermediary for subsequent use by others, the seller discharges his duty to warn when it can be
concluded reasonably that the intermediary is
in a superior position to warn ultimate users,
and when the bulk seller can rely reasonably
upon the intermediary to utilize that superior
position to do so.
What is the gloss to or amplification of
existing warnings law that the Third
Restatement affects? I won't describe to you
what the Restatement provision is, as you have
it in your materials. But I have selected a subset of warnings issues to illustrate the new
Restatement 's substantial fidelity to the decisional law interpreted by the Second
Restatement.
The warning duties tied foreseeable hazards, together with the accompanying
Comments and Reporters' Notes, make it clear
that a seller's warning obligation is triggered
only by hazards that are known or knowable at
the time the product was initially introduced
into commerce. This is a nearly universal rule,
and it's the appropriate rule for the new
Restatement.
The Products Liability Restatement's
preservation of the open and obvious rule is
supported by the position taken in a majority of
jurisdictions that there is just no duty to warn of
obvious risks. The rationale for not requiring
warnings in such instances is stated in comment
j to section 2 which states: "When a risk is
obvious or generally known, the prospective
addressee of the warning will or should already
know of its existence. Warning of an obvious
or generally known risk in most instances will
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pensively remediate the hazard. Illustrative of
this case is one called Beauchamp x uss sell,^
which involved the issue of the relation, if any,
between an air valve component in a pneumatically-run palletizer and the injury of the plaintiffs spouse. The court therein suggested that
the duty to warn should properly be placed
upon the marketing participant with the greatest
access to the information and the easiest of its
dissemination; in this case, the component part
manufacturer.lo
As regards obvious risks, the general rule
that there is no such duty can be validated in
terms of efficiency as the new Restatement
endorses avoidance of unnecessary transaction
costs to the marketing of useful products. The
Products Liability Restatement also retains an
efficient rule that would relieve the component
or ingredient supplier of liability when the
component or ingredient is not itself defective.
In such circumstances the component or ingredient supplier ordinarily has no meaningful
control over the hazard level of the finished
product.

when the court stated that "a duty to warn
attaches whenever a reasonable man would
want to be informed of the risk in order to
decide whether to expose himself to it."6
From an efficiency perspective, one of the
efficiency approach's most noteworthy constructs has been to espouse a tort doctrine that
will deter persons from engaging in activities
that a reasonable person would view ahead of
time to be socially wasteful. Transferred to a
products liability context, what if the seller of a
product without adequate warning causes personal physical injury or property damage? A
seller of a product with a high risk level bargains for the right to sell it, which is to say, preserves the transaction within the market, by
conveying warnings sufficient to convey to
buyers or users information sufficient to make
an informed choice of whether or not to expose
themselves to the risk. Absent that bargain
struck, absent that informed judgment, a defective product that causes injury represents an
involuntary or coerced transfer of wealth from
the injured party to the injurer. The wastefulness, of course, cannot be gainsaid. It leads
directly to the type of litigation with which you
are all familiar.
In the main, the Products Liability
Restatement k treatment of warnings to intermediaries can be harmonized readily with both
Posner's market efficiency7 and Calabresi's
least cost avoide? approaches. Under the latter, the least cost avoider approach, a manufacturer will ordinarily be the least cost avoider in
that it, rather than the purchaser or the intermediate seller, is presumed to be an expert in all of
the risk potential of the product and therefore
will be in a better position than the user or consumer to know and, as appropriate, most inex-
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1 . Fisher v. Johnson Milk Co., 174 N.W.2d 752.753
(Mich. 1970) (quoting Jamieson v. Woodward & lathrop,
247 F.2d 23.26 (D.C. Cir. 1957)).
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5 2 cmt. j (1997).
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3. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twenki,
Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell
of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U.L. REV. 265,296 (1990).
4. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of
Tort Low: Aflrming Both Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 75 TEX.L. REV. 1801 (1997).
5. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
6. Id. at 1089.
7. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
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1-4 (1988).
8. See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the
M a n u f a c ~of Taric Products, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 773,
797 (1 997).
9. 547 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
10. Id. at 1 197.
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